Wonks perform three functions in federal k-12 education policy: they generate "theories of change" intended to improve educational outcomes; debate the validity of theories in light of real-world data; and provide guidance and legitimacy to the decisions of elected and appointed officials.

The assessment of prominent right-of-center education policy wonks Checker Finn and Rick Hess in the August-September issue of Policy Review, that today's SES program can't work, speaks to the last two of these roles.

[S]es poses a particular challenge. Districts don’t like losing money (which happens when parents opt for outside providers to deliver ses) but they don’t mind their teachers earning extra dollars on the side. Providers of tutoring are loath to be regulated by hostile state authorities and may not teach in ways aligned to district curricula or state tests — but definitely want to maximize their enrollments. Parents get information through the school, which has little reason to steer them to outsiders who will take district funds and not necessarily help schools make ayp.

Across the land, evaluation and quality control have received scant attention, parent outreach has been half-hearted, and the ses machinery has proven balky. This development is not simply a consequence of lackluster implementation and perverse incentives; it ’s also a result of the hodgepodge of theories and compromises baked into the ses program itself. One faction views ses as prelude to full-fledged vouchers and, believing in competition as a tool of school improvement, holds that allowing private tutoring providers to compete for Title 1 dollars will press low-performing districts to improve. A second group regards ses  chiefly as a way to provide extra instruction to youngsters in low-performing schools, crafted to avoid harming either those students or their schools. A third cadre sees it as a mechanism for nurturing an industry of for-profit and nonprofit providers and innovative approaches to serving at-risk students.

Unfortunately, these disparate theories and strategies work at cross-purposes. In the end, there has not been competition, demonstrably effective remediation, or much evidence of innovation. We conclude that the ses  provision is unworkable as presently designed.

Your editor would argue that the mess Finn and Hess describe has nothing to do with policy wonks' theories of change and everything to do with the intentions of all the parties involved in implementation, but the two have certainly pegged the mess.

What's the significance of their conclusion to the future of Supplemental Educational Services (SES) in NCLB II? The truth of their finding is hardly relevant, the assessment itself is mightily important.

Politicians faced with a vote on any issue employ a limited number of decision criteria: interest group pressure, popular will, favors owed or given to colleagues, expert judgment and their own ideology.

When it comes to No Child Left Behind's SES provisions, popular will probably won't count for much. No Congressional election will be decided by an incumbent's vote on NCLB II, let alone SES.

Interest group pressure runs against the program - no institution representing the "powers that be" in public education likes SES; most will try to kill it if they think they can. The SES providers' trade group, the Education Industry Association, has ideological allies up on the Hill, but nothing in the way of independent persuasive power like the National Association of School Boards and the teachers unions to pull fence setters onto their side.

Many pro-market conservatives who might otherwise see SES as a step towards school vouchers are also strongly pro-states rights, resent federal interference in k-12 policy - especially "unfunded mandates," and would prefer voucher programs to be passed by state legislatures.

So, if SES is to have a role in NCLB II anything like NCLB I, it will depend on the favors owed or offered to ideologically sympathetic Representatives and Senators by their moderate, undecided and "states rights" colleagues; and on the assessments of education policy wonks that members of those three groups respect.

Here is where the opinion of Finn and Hess matters. When fence sitters get to "the merits of the case," legislators won't hear the expected arguments favoring SES from the two. Indeed, Hess and Finn aren't just sitting this one out; they've decided to say the program is "unworkable." Opponents of SES will tell the fence sitters "even two prominent members of the voucher camp -Finn and Hess - agree SES doesn't work." So, unless a Congressman owes a pro-SES colleague a favor or sees an oppottunity for logrolling, if the program can't work, why should he or she move from the fence into the pro-SES camp?

This is a pretty serious warning indicator for SES providers.  Another reason to start reviewing the legislative option discussed here.